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Abstract
Mathematics has long been an important tool for understanding and controlling the spread
of infectious diseases. Here, we begin with an overview of compartmental models, the traditional
approach to modeling infectious disease dynamics, and then introduce contact network epidemi-
ology, a relatively new approach that applies bond percolation on random graphs to model the
spread of infectious disease through heterogeneous populations. As we illustrate, these methods
can be used to address public health challenges and have recently been coupled with powerful
computational methods to optimize epidemic control strategies.
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1 Introduction
As the novel 2009 H1N1 strain of influenza emerged out of Mexico and rapidly spread around the
globe, public health agencies scrambled to understand and control its spread. The World Health
Organization (WHO) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) immediately
looked to statisticians and mathematical modelers to make sense of the sparse and noisy data avail-
able from the initial outbreaks. In order to make informed decisions about school closures, travel
restrictions, and uses of limited resources such as antiviral medications, public health authorities
needed to know the rate of spread and severity of the new strain, as well as whether prior flu vac-
cines or exposure to existing strains provided any immunity to H1N1/09. As evidenced by several
papers published jointly by academic researchers and public health officials within a few months of
the emergence of H1N1/09 [23, 47, 65], mathematical modeling played a vital role in shaping the
global public health response to the pandemic.
The mathematical techniques used to understand, forecast and control the spread of infectious
diseases like influenza are diverse and growing rapidly. Some techniques have been newly developed
while others build upon existing methods from diverse fields including dynamical systems, stochastic
processes, statistical physics, graph theory, statistics, operations research and high performance
computing. Here, we present an overview of the some of the most widely used and promising
mathematical approaches to modeling the spread of infectious disease. In Section 2, we present an
overview of compartmental models, the workhorse of mathematical epidemiology throughout the
twentieth century. In Sections 3 and 4, we discuss parameterization of infectious disease models and
some limitations of the standard modeling approaches. In Section 5, we turn to contact network
modeling, a relatively new analytical approach that explicitly considers complex human population
structures, thereby overcoming a major limitation of compartmental models. In Section 6, we
conclude by discussing the promising application of advanced optimization methods to designing
public health policies.
2 Compartmental SIR Model
The first differential equation models of infectious disease dynamics go back as far as 1766, to the
work of Daniel Bernoulli, which has been recently re-published [12]. Modern differential equation
models of epidemics were introduced by Kermack and McKendrick [30] and later expanded by
Anderson and May [4, 5].
In this section, we present an intuitive overview of modern compartmental models. First we
discuss the relationship between discrete-time, discrete-state population models and the continuous-
time, continuous-state compartmental models; second, we examine the critical parameters required
to instantiate epidemic models. Throughout this section, we focus on a simple and widely-used
version of the SIR compartmental model and provide insights into the model’s behavior.
Consider a population of N individuals and the following simple discrete-time, discrete-state
epidemic model. Each individual begins in one of the three possible states:
1. Susceptible, meaning that the individual has never had the disease and is susceptible to being
infected.
2. Infected, meaning that the individual currently has the disease and can infect other people.
3. Resistant, meaning that the individual does not have the disease, cannot infect others, and
cannot be infected.
The model then evolves in discrete time steps, with all individuals simultaneously acting as follows
in each time step:
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1. Each susceptible individual draws a uniformly random person from the population. If the
person drawn is infected, then the susceptible individual changes his state to infected with
probability β.
2. Each infected individual changes his state to resistant with probability γ.
3. Each resistant individual remains resistant.
Intuitively, the above discrete-time, discrete-space model simulates a population of interacting
individuals. Interactions are modeled from the perspective of susceptible individuals, who can
become infected during interactions with infected individuals. A population that interacts in such
a uniformly random and independent way between time steps is called a homogeneously mixed
population.
The model also simulates the progression of the disease through the three available states.
Individuals are first susceptible, then infected, and then become resistant by acquiring immunity
to the disease. The parameter β captures the ability of the disease to be transmitted from one
person to another, while the parameter γ is related to length of the period for which an individual
can transmit the disease, called the infectious period. Specifically, the total time spent in the
infected state by an individual is a geometric random variable with success probability γ, making
the expected length of the infectious period equal to 1
γ
.
The abbreviation SIR stands for the three available states: susceptible, infected, and resistant.
However, the term SIR model typically refers to a continuous differential equation model that we
will now derive from the above discrete model. Suppose that the initial condition of the population
is given, and let the random variables X(t), Y(t) and Z(t) denote the number of susceptible, infected,
and resistant individuals in the population at time t. Since each individual is always in one of the
three states, it is always the case that X(t) + Y(t) + Z(t) = N . Given the values of these three
quantities at time t, we can calculate their expected values at time t + 1:




E[Y(t + 1)] = X(t) · (
Y(t)
N
· β) + Y(t) · (1− γ)
E[Z(t + 1)] = Y(t) · γ + Z(t).
These equations are based on the basic assumptions of the model. The first equation expresses
that X(t) susceptible individuals at time t act similarly and independently, each remaining in the
susceptible state with probability (1 − Y(t)
N
· β); the second equation indicates that an expected
X(t) ·(Y(t)
N
·β) individuals enter the infected state and Y(t) ·γ infected individuals leave the infected
state; and the third equation reflects that the individuals who leave the infected state enter the
resistant state, and resistant individuals remain resistant. Re-arranging the three equations above,
we obtain
E[X(t + 1)]−X(t) = −β ·X(t) ·
Y(t)
N




E[Z(t + 1)]− Z(t) = γ ·Y(t).
The next step of the derivation uses the mean-field approximation, which is at times mathemat-
ically controversial. The controversy stems from the fact that the accuracy of the approximation
is application dependent and often difficult to analyze. The mean-field approximation allows us to
forget the fact that X(t), Y(t), and Z(t) are random variables and simply equate them with their
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expectations. Regardless of the controversy, the mean-field approximation is practically useful and
later in this section we provide some experimental evidence of its applicability to our homogeneously
mixed population model. Applying the mean-field approximation to the above equations, allows
us to rewrite them as:
X(t + 1)−X(t) = −β ·X(t) ·
Y(t)
N




Z(t + 1)− Z(t) = γ ·Y(t).
The differential equations of the continuous-time, continuous-state SIR model that we seek are
evident in the three difference equations above. However, the above equations are fixed at a time-
difference of 1, because our discrete-time model moves in these increments. To complete the final
step, we create a sequence of discrete-time models from which we derive the continuous-time model.
The derivation is reminiscent of the proof that a sequence of geometric random variables converges
to an exponential random variable (see Appendix A).
Let ∆t be a real number less than one. We create a discrete-time model that moves in incre-
ments of ∆t simply by changing the parameters β, γ to ∆tβ,∆tγ. Intuitively, by thus altering the
parameters, we keep the expected number of successes in a unit time interval the same for each
discrete-time model. Applying our derived difference equations above, we have
X(t + ∆t)−X(t) = −∆tβ ·X(t) ·
Y(t)
N




Z(t + ∆t)− Z(t) = ∆tγ ·Y(t).
Dividing by ∆t and taking the limit as ∆t goes to zero gives us the following differential equations:
dX(t)
dt






= β ·X(t) ·
Y(t)
N
− γ ·Y(t)· (2)
dZ(t)
dt
= γ ·Y(t). (3)
Equations (1)-(3) are referred to as a mass-action SIR compartmental model. The adjective
mass-action comes from the fact that in the original discrete model, all individuals act similarly
yet separately from each other. The adjective compartmental comes from viewing the three disease
states as compartments into and out of which individuals move throughout the epidemic. Finally,
if we make the variable substitutions S(t) = X(t)
N
, I(t) = Y(t)
N





= −β · S(t) · I(t) (4)
dI(t)
dt
= β · S(t) · I(t)− γ · I(t) (5)
dR(t)
dt
= γ · I(t). (6)
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Figure 1: Comparison of a discrete-time, discrete-state disease model and the corresponding com-
partmental SIR model. Both models have parameters β, γ = 0.4, 0.2. The discrete model has
population size of 100, 000 and initial condition of 100 infected and the remaining susceptible. The
SIR model has an initial fraction 100100,000 of the population infected and the rest susceptible. The
agreement provides some justification for our use of the mean-field approximation. The figure also
provides an example of typical SIR epidemic curves.
Equations (4)-(6) are the typical form of the simple compartmental SIR models encountered in
the literature, with S(t), I(t) and R(t) representing the fraction of the population in each disease
state. Often, for the sake of brevity, the explicit dependence on t is dropped.
To verify our derivations, we compare simulations of the original discrete-time, discrete-space
model with predictions of the derived differential equation model. The black dots in Figure 1 are
a plot of 200 runs of the discrete-time, discrete-space model with a population size of 100, 000
individuals, 100 of whom are initially infected and the rest susceptible. The three lines in the
figure represent the solution to the numerically integrated compartmental SIR model. For both the
discrete-time model and the differential equations, we set β, γ = 0.4, 0.2. The agreement between
the discrete model and the differential equation model that we see in Figure 1 provides some
justification for the mean-field approximation we used in our derivations.
Figure 1 also provides an example of the typical epidemic curves both seen in real-world epi-
demics and produced by SIR models. Initially, the epidemic and the number of infected individuals
grows exponentially. However, there is a turning point when more infected individuals leave the
infected compartment than enter it. The epidemic ends when the number of infected individuals
drops to 0, which often happens before all susceptible individuals in the populations are infected.
We can now ask simple, yet illuminating questions of the compartmental SIR model. Perhaps
the first and most important question to ask is: Which diseases have the ability to spread in the
population and thus become epidemics? SIR models parameterize diseases using two parameters:
the infectivity parameter, β, and the infectious period parameter, γ. We can restate the basic
question as: For what values of β and γ will we see an epidemic?
Intuitively, an epidemic grows when an infected individual, throughout their entire infectious
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period, creates more than one newly infected individual. For example, suppose each infected
individual creates two new infections throughout their infectious period. If we start with only
a single infected individual, when that first person recovers from the disease, there will be two
new infected individuals. When those two individuals recover, there will be four new infected
individuals, and so forth. This leads to the exponential growth of the epidemic.
In the SIR model, individuals leave the infected compartment at a rate γ, giving an infectious
period of 1
γ
for each individual. At the beginning of the epidemic, when S(t) is close to 1 and I(t) is
just above zero, each infected individual creates new infections at a rate of β. So, the total number
of new infections created by each infected individual throughout their entire infectious period is β
γ
.
Thus, from our intuitive derivation, for the SIR model, if β
γ
> 1, a disease will become an epidemic.
The same result can be derived mathematically. We simply want dI(t)
dt
to be greater than 0 at
the onset of the outbreak. If S(t) is close to 1 and I(t) is just above zero, we can state the condition
as β · S(t) · I(t)− γ · I(t) ≈ β · I(t)− γ · I(t) > 0. Which gives β · I(t) > γ · I(t), or β
γ
> 1.
To address the fundamental question of “Which diseases become epidemics?”, we define a
useful epidemiological quantity. Let R0, also called the basic reproduction number, be the expected
number of new infections created by an infected individual under the most favorable conditions
for transmission. For the SIR model, we have R0 =
β
γ
. In general, for any disease in any host
population, the disease can become an epidemic only if R0 > 1. The mathematical condition
R0 > 1 can be intuitively interpreted as saying that there exist some conditions under which the
disease can grow. For the SIR model, those “most favorable conditions” are when S(t) is close to 1
and I(t) is just above zero. Since R0 describes the number of new infecteds created by each infected
individual, then, during the earliest stages of an epidemic, the number of infected individuals in
the ith generation of transmission is roughly Ri0.
The behavior of the basic SIR model varies as we alter R0, β and γ. Figure 2(a) depicts the
infected compartment curves as we fix γ to 0.2 and alter β, and thus R0. As can be intuitively
expected, values of R0 that are close to one produce very slow-growing epidemics, while values of
R0 much greater than one produce fast, explosive epidemics.
If we were to keep R0 fixed, but alter γ, we could stretch any of the curves in Figure 2(a) along
the horizontal axis. Intuitively γ provides a time-scale of the epidemic. However, the final epidemic
size is fixed by the value of R0. This is demonstrated by Figure 2(b), which plots resistant curves
when we keep R0 fixed, but vary the values of β and γ. For a mathematical derivation of final
epidemic size in an SIR model as a function of R0, see Keeling and Rohani [29].
Finally, though we have discussed a simple SIR model, the approach can be extended to model
more complex disease progression, as well as more complex population structures. For example,
Equations (7)-(9) represent a model where we have introduced a natural birth/death process that
removes individuals from all compartments and introduces individuals into the susceptible com-
partment. In this model, µ is the birth/death rate. On the other hand, Equations (10)-(13) have
introduced a latent period of the disease, between the susceptible and infected compartments. In
this model, E stands for the exposed compartment of infected individuals in the latent stage of
infection; and σ is the rate at which these individuals progress to the active stage of infection.
Introducing more complex population structure can also be done to some extent by adding a set
of SIR variables for each group of individuals in the population. See Keeling and Rohani [29] for
more on compartmental models.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of SIR compartmental models. (a) The rate and magnitude of the epidemic
varies with R0. The y-axis shows the fraction of the population currently infected. Here γ is fixed
to 0.2 and R0 varies. Diseases with R0 close to one produce slow-growing epidemics. Higher values
of R0 yield quickly growing, explosive epidemics. (b) The progression of the epidemic varies with
γ and β. The y-axis shows the changing fraction of the population in the resistant compartment.
Here R0 is held constant while β and γ vary. The infectious period parameter γ provides a time-
scale for the epidemic, hastening the epidemic as γ increases, which decreases the infectious period.
However, the final epidemic size is fixed by the constant value of R0.
dS
dt
= −β · S · I + µ · (I + R) (7)
dI
dt
= β · S · I− γ · I− µ · I (8)
dR
dt
= γ · I− µ · R (9)
dS
dt
= −β · S · I (10)
dE
dt
= β · S · I− σ · E (11)
dI
dt
= σ · E − γ · I (12)
dR
dt
= γ · I. (13)
3 Estimating Epidemiological Rates and Constants
Epidemiological models are only as good as their parameter values. That is, accurate forecasting
and understanding of disease dynamics requires finding and using realistic epidemiological rates
and constants in the equations. As we have already seen, the value of R0 crucially affects epidemic
dynamics. In addition, inaccurate estimates of the infectious period can lead to miss-calculating the
timing of epidemic peaks, when resources are most needed. Thus, much research effort is devoted to
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accurate parameter estimation of emerging infectious diseases. In this section, we briefly describe
some of the methods and pitfalls in estimating disease parameters using real-life data.
Typical data available at the beginning of an epidemic includes a time-series of new-case occur-
rences, from surveillance, physician reports, or hospitalizations [28]. Occasionally, data describing
individual-to-individual chains of transmissions is also available. For example, a family member
could contract the disease abroad and return to infect other family members some time later. In a
recent example, an index case of H1N1/09 created 13 new cases during a bus trip on the way to a
soccer match in Scotland [53].
Parameterization often starts with estimation of the time-scale and rate of growth of the epi-
demic. There are two dominant approaches to estimating the time-scale of transmission. Using the
first approach, one can estimate the generation time, defined as the expected length of time be-
tween infection of an index case and infection of his/her secondary cases [51]. Inter-infection times
between the index case and all those whom they infect are simply averaged. However, determining
the timing of infections can be complicated for diseases with asymptomatic periods of unknown or
variable duration. Using the second approach, one can estimate a quantity closely related to the
generation time, the serial interval, defined as the time between the clinical onset of symptoms in
the index case and the clinical onset of symptoms in the average secondary case. Both approaches
require data on individual-to-individual chains of transmission.
The rate of growth of an epidemic is typically estimated from time-series data of new cases. The
basic reproduction number (R0) gives us the ratio between the numbers of infected individuals in
consecutive generations of the epidemic. If the generation time has already been estimated, then the
time-series of new case occurrences can be grouped into generations. One can then estimate R0 by
fitting an exponential growth to the resulting grouping, using an appropriate statistical model [11,
13, 35]. Recently, higher fidelity methods, accounting for non-homogeneously mixed populations
and delays in reporting, have been developed for estimating R0 [47, 58, 62]. In Appendix B, using
an SIR model, we provide an example of the complex and model specific methods required for
model parameterization.
4 Limitations of Compartmental Models
While compartmental SIR models have proven to be quite useful in modeling epidemics, they do
not properly model some important aspects of disease spread. For example, consider the 2002-2003
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Estimates of R0 based on the initial
outbreak of SARS ranged between 2.2 and 3.6 [35, 50]. The case fatality ratio was estimated to
be between 11% and 13% [18, 63]. For comparison, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services assigns the greatest pandemic severity ranking to pandemics with a case fatality ratio of 2%;
pandemics with this ranking would require the strictest national response strategies [54, 52]. Based
on the estimates of R0, SARS should have caused a great world pandemic with cases numbering
easily in the millions. However, for the entire SARS outbreak (from November 1st 2002 to July
31st 2003), only 8, 096 cases were reported with 774 deaths [64].
Certainly, one explanation for the limited spread of SARS is the quick response by world public
health agencies, who imposed strict quarantines on infected individuals. Another likely explanation
for the discrepancy is that the estimates for R0 were based on data involving large numbers of
transmissions in hospitals, where people have unusually high rates of contact. SIR models assume
a fully mixed, homogeneous population – the mass-action assumption – in which each individual has
the same amount of contacts as every other individual. Thus, simple SIR models do not accurately











Figure 3: The complexity of epidemiological models. It is often useful to think of models in
two dimensions: the extent to which they capture real-world complexities that impact disease
transmission (y-axis) and their computational tractability (x-axis). Compartmental models are
easy to analyze but miss important, realistic details, such as heterogeneous patterns and types of
contacts. Agent-based simulations are able to model reality with a great amount of detail, but
are difficult to parameterize, analyze, and require large amounts computation. Contact network
models capture disease transmission with a higher fidelity than compartmental models, yet remain
analytically tractable.
individuals. If the population at large had as many contacts as the population within a hospital,
perhaps the estimates of R0 would have been more accurate, and SARS would have infected many
more people.
Incorporating realistic contact patterns of the population is just one possible way to increase
the fidelity of epidemic models. Diseases often spread differently in different age groups, have
varying incubation periods in different age groups, spread differently depending on the type of
contact – e.g., contacts at home tend to be more intimate than contacts at work. Also, disease
spread is affected by geographic location and seasonality. Researchers have built very high-fidelity
models using agent-based simulations, where each individual is tracked as they move from home,
to work and back [19]. Naturally, such models involve complex parameterization and often require
extensive computation (see Figure 3). In the next section, we introduce contact network models,
a type of epidemiological model that lies between between compartmental models and agent-based
simulations, providing higher fidelity, yet tractable formulations.
5 Contact Network Modeling
Contact network epidemiology is an analytical framework that intuitively captures the diverse host
interactions that underlie parasite transmission [39, 45]. The first step in this modeling approach
is to build a realistic network model of contact patterns at an appropriate temporal and spatial
scale. The second step is to predict the spread of disease through the resulting network, based
on intrinsic features of the parasite and the network structure. To mathematically analyze disease
spread through networks, we apply generating function methods adapted from an area of statistical
physics called percolation theory [27].
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5.1 Building a contact network model
A contact network model uses a graph to capture patterns of interactions that can lead to parasite
transmission. Each host (or group of hosts) translates into a node and contacts among hosts (or
groups) translate into edges connecting appropriate nodes. The number of edges emanating from
a node is called the degree of the node and indicates the number of contacts along which parasite
transmission is possible. The distribution of the number of such contacts within a population, called
the degree distribution, fundamentally influences the spread of pathogens through the population.
The study of contact networks, and more generally of social networks, is of growing importance
in a diverse group of disciplines [3, 61, 31]. Researchers seek universal properties, and have focused
on small-world networks – with high levels of both local clustering and global connectivity [60] –
and scale free networks – with power-law degree distributions leading to a small fraction of very
highly connected hubs [10].
Several epidemiologically relevant networks including sexual contact networks have been char-
acterized as scale free [34, 46]; however, researchers have found that realistic contact networks
do not always exhibit these well-studied structural properties [7]. For example, contact networks
underlying the spread of respiratory and air-borne diseases tend to have degree distributions that
appear more exponential in shape than scale free, homogeneous (all nodes have the same degree), or
random (Poisson degree distribution) (see Figure 4). In the remainder of this section, we describe
a various approaches to constructing realistic contact networks and provide three specific examples
from the literature.
To construct a contact network for any particular disease or class of diseases, we first define
an epidemiological contact. For respiratory diseases, this may mean close physical proximity for a
specified duration; or, for sexually transmitted diseases, this may mean having sexual relations or
sharing needles. We then seek data on the distribution of such contacts across the focal population.
This data may come from sociological surveys [43, 49] or wildlife studies [15]; or the distributions
can be inferred from general information about activity patterns, using statistical tools or computer
simulations that generate explicit networks from such patterns [19, 42].
On a small scale, we have modeled the activity patterns that underlie the transmission of
respiratory-borne diseases in a psychiatric institution in Evansville, Indiana based on detailed
information about the distribution of caregivers and patients among wards [40]. We represent
these contacts in a bipartite network. One set of nodes represent health care workers and the other
represent entire wards filled with patients (see Figure 5(b)). For this particular institution, there
were few if any direct contacts between patients in different wards or between caregivers outside of
wards, and thus we ignore ward-ward and caregiver-caregiver contacts in the model.
On an intermediate scale, we have developed software to generate contact network models for
an urban setting [42, 48, 9]. Based on detailed demographic, employment, school, and hospital
data for the city of Vancouver, British Columbia, we model interactions within homes, schools,
neighborhoods, work, hospitals, shops, restaurants, etc. We start with up to one million households,
drawn at random from the Vancouver household size distribution, which yields up to 2.6 million
people. Household members are assigned ages according to the Vancouver age distribution. Each
individual, based on age, is then assigned to daycare centers according to early childhood care
statistics, to schools according to school and class size distributions, to occupations according to
employment data, to hospitals as patients and caregivers according to hospital employment and bed
occupancy data, and to other public places. Within each location we create random connections
between individuals with probabilities ranging from zero to one, depending on the type of location.
The resulting network is undirected, meaning that transmission may occur in either direction
along an edge (see Figure 5(a)). For example, two individuals in the same household will have equal
9






















(a) Degree distributions (b) Homogeneous network
(c) Poisson network (d) Exponential network (e) Scale-free network
Figure 4: Comparing networks with different degree distributions. (a) Several degree distributions
with a mean degree of 10: homogeneous, where all nodes have exactly 10 contacts (black), Pois-
son distribution (green), exponential distribution (blue), power law distribution (cyan). (b)-(e)
Examples of homogeneous, Poisson, exponential, and scale free networks, respectively, with degree
distributions shown in (a). Contact networks underlying spread of respiratory diseases like flu tend
to have exponential-like distributions (blue).
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opportunities to infect each other. There are cases, however, where a person may infect another
person but the converse is not true. Suppose individual A is normally healthy and thus has no reason
to go to the hospital until he or she becomes infected with a severe infectious disease. At that point,
individual A may come into contact and potentially spread disease to health care workers (HCW).
In contrast, if an HCW acquired the disease while individual A remained healthy, then there would
be no opportunity for transmission in the opposite direction. To model the unidirectional flow of
disease into hospitals we include directed edges from individuals in the population at large to HCWs,
yielding a semi-directed network with both directed and undirected edges (see Figure 5(c)). For
diseases like SARS and severe pandemic flu, most individuals would likely seek medical treatment
upon developing symptoms, and thus the contact network model for these diseases would include
directed edges from most of the population to HCWs. In contrast, for a disease like seasonal flu,
only the high-risk populations – such as the very young, elderly, or immunocompromised – tend to
seek hospital care, and thus the seasonal flu contact network model would include directed edges
for high-risk groups only.
On a large scale, we have modeled the connectivity among the largest cities in North America. In
this case, the nodes are cities and the edges reflect travel patterns between cities via air and ground
transportation, as reported by the US Census Bureau, the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa, and Statistics Canada. In this case, the edges of
our network are weighted by travel flux and diseases spread within cities via simple compartmental
models [17] (see Figures 5(d) and 9(a)).
5.2 Using Bond Percolation to Model Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR)
Disease Dynamics
Imagine that a parasite initially appears at a random node in a contact network. The disease
propagates through the network similarly as in an SIR compartmental model, except that the spread
is guided by the structure of the contact network instead of the uniformly random contact patterns
of a compartmental model. The initial node remains infectious for some period of time, during
which it has the potential to transmit disease to each of its contacts. The secondary cases likewise
can transmit disease to their contacts during their infectious periods, and so on. This process
resembles simple bond percolation from statistical physics which models, for example, the flow of
a liquid through a porous material [27]. Just as the liquid traverses gaps in the porous material
with a characteristic viscosity, a disease spreads from person-to-person with a characteristic level
of infectiousness. In general, percolation theory describes connectivity in random graphs, and thus
can be applied to predict the size of the infected cluster, that is, the number of nodes reached via
parasite transmission along the edges in the network. This approach was initially suggested by
Grassberger [26] and Newman [45]. Recently, we have extended it into a flexible framework for
infectious disease modeling [40, 42, 41]. These methods allow us to make predictions for infinite
networks with a specified degree distribution. To use it, we must assume that (1) the contact
network is infinite (or quite large) and (2) the epidemiologically-relevant structure of the network
is adequately summarized in its degree distribution. The second assumption means that we ignore
additional structure, like local clustering, beyond what is expected in an infinite network with the
given degree distribution. To test that these assumptions are reasonable, we often compare our
mathematical predictions (based only on the degree distribution of the network) to simulations of
disease spread through the full finite-sized contact network.
The fate of an outbreak depends on both the level of contagion and the structure of the un-
derlying contact network. To model contagion, every edge in a network is given a probability of
pathogen transmission along it (Tij), that is, the probability that host i, if infected, will transmit
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disease to individual j during his or her infectious period. If it is reasonable to assume that the Tij
are independently and identically distributed (iid) random variables, then we can make calculations
based solely on the average of these probabilities (T ) [45]. This value summarizes core aspects of
disease transmission including the rate at which contacts take place between hosts, the likelihood
that an encounter will lead to transmission, the duration of the infectious period, and individual
susceptibility. When the Tij are not iid, percolation calculations are possible but more difficult.
In these calculations, we use the degree distribution of a network to indicate its structure.
Probability generating functions (pgfs) are functions that completely describe discrete probability
distributions. For infectious disease modeling, the pgf of a contact network’s degree distribution
summarizes useful information about the structure of the contact network. For example, the pgf for
the degree distribution of an undirected random network is G0(x) =
∑∞
k=1 pkx
k, where pk is the rel-
ative frequency of nodes of degree k in the network. Using straightforward probabilistic arguments,
we sequentially derive pgfs for the distributions of (1) the number of edges emanating from a node
reached along a randomly chosen edge: G1(x) = G
′
0(x)/〈k〉, where 〈k〉 = G
′
0(1) is the average degree
in the network, (2) the number of edges along which disease transmits from an infected node during
an outbreak: G0(x; T ) = G0(1+(x−1)T ), where T is the average probability of transmission, and (3)
the size of outbreaks stemming from a single introduction of disease: H0(x; T ) = xG0(H1(x; T ); T ),
where H1 is defined by the self-referential pgf H1(x; T ) = xG1(H1(x; T ); T ) [45].
For a random network with a given degree distribution, there typically exists a threshold trans-
mission rate below which small, finite-sized outbreaks occur and above which large-scale epidemics,
comparable to the size of the network, are possible. This epidemic threshold is analogous to the
well-studied percolation threshold1, and it depends on the network structure. In an undirected ran-
dom network with a given degree distribution, for example, the epidemic threshold is Tc = 1/G
′
1(1).
Intuitively, G′1(1) can be interpreted as the pgf for the number of susceptible contacts for each in-
fected individual. So, as in our discussion of the basic reproductive number, an epidemic occurs
if, in expectation, each infected individual creates more than one newly infected individual, i.e. if
T · G′1(1) > 1. Highly connected networks, with ample opportunities for transmission, have low
epidemic thresholds. In such networks, even mildly transmissible parasites will be able to cause
epidemics. Less connected networks will have higher epidemic thresholds. The pgf approach also





, and both the probability and expected size of a large epidemic for a parasite above
the epidemic threshold, which are equal to each other in undirected networks, 1−G0(u; T ) where
the self-referential u = G1(u; T ) can be solved numerically [45].
Newman introduced the pgf approach to analyzing epidemics [45]. We have since derived similar
quantities for bipartite and semidirected networks [40, 41], and extended it to calculate a number of
important epidemiological quantities on networks, including: (1) epidemic threshold, (2) expected
size of a small outbreak, (3) probability of a large-scale epidemic, (4) expected size of a large-
scale epidemic (should one occur), (5) quantities 1-4 conditioned upon the identity of the node
(or nodes) where the parasite first appeared, (6) quantities 1-4 conditioned upon the size of an
initial outbreak, (7) the probability that a specific node will become infected during an epidemic,
and (8) the degree distribution of the residual network (the remaining network of uninfected nodes
following an epidemic) [40, 42, 41, 21, 8].
1In a network in which every pair of nodes are connected with probability p, the percolation threshold is the value
of p above which connected clusters are expected to span the entire (infinite) network.
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5.3 Dynamic Network Models
The bond percolation approach captures an important aspect of population heterogeneity, but has
two important shortcomings. First, it predicts the final state of an outbreak, but not the temporal
progression of disease. Second, it assumes that the contact network is static, that is, that the
numbers and identities of a node’s contacts are fixed throughout the outbreak. Although this
assumption may be reasonable for rapidly spreading diseases, there are many situations in which
the underlying network will change considerably during an outbreak. For example, concurrent and
serial contacts are known to strongly influence the spread of sexually transmitted infections like
HIV [59, 22, 1].
Volz recently developed a low-dimensional system of non-linear ordinary differential equations
to model the dynamical progression of a disease spreading through static random networks with
arbitrary degree distributions [55]; and we have extended this framework from static networks to
dynamic networks [56]. This model improves on the bond percolation approach in that it both
predicts the temporal progression of disease and allows for changing structure in the underlying
network. Specifically, the model considers a simple class of dynamic networks in which pairs of
edges are randomly chosen and swapped. For example, if edges AB and CD are chosen, then
they are deleted and replaced by edges AD and CB. In this neighbor exchange model, each node
maintains a constant number of contacts, but the identities of those contacts may change randomly.








































The model consists of four core dynamic variables: θ is the fraction of degree one nodes that are
still susceptible; MSI is the fraction of edges in the network connecting a susceptible node and an
infected node; MSS is the fraction of edges in the network connecting two susceptible nodes; and
MI is the fraction of edges in the network adjacent on an infected node, regardless of the state of
the node at the other end of the edge. There are also four fixed parameters: r is the transmission
rate; µ is the recovery rate; g(x) is the pgf for the network degree distribution; and ρ is the neighbor
exchange rate. To simplify the equations, we also use three helper values: M = g′(1) is the total
number of edges in the network; MS = θg
′(θ) is the fraction of edges adjacent on a susceptible
node; and δ = θg
′′(θ)
g′(θ) is the average excess degree for a susceptible node selected by following a
random chosen I ↔ S edge. Excess degree is defined as the degree of the node minus one. The
last two of these helper values vary as the epidemic progresses through the network. Finally, the
equations highlight the commonly appearing term rMSI , which is the rate of transmission events
in the network per unit time.
This model tracks the state of each edge and each stub (one end of an edge) as disease spreads
through the network. Figure 6 illustrates the impact of new infections, recoveries, and neighbor
exchanges on the composition of edges in the network. To provide some intuition behind these
equations, we deconstruct each one here.
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(a) Undirected network (b) Bipartite network (c) Semidirected network (d) Weighted network
Figure 5: Common classes of networks used to model disease spread. (a) Simple undirected network.
This type of network has been used for modeling person-to-person contacts. (b) Bipartite network.
This type of network has been used for modeling contacts between caregivers and wards. (c)
Semidirected network. This type of network has been used for modeling the one-way contacts from
the general population to heath care workers. (d) Weighted network. This type of network has
been used for modeling travel patterns between cities.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: The impact of infections, recoveries and neighbor exchanges on the composition of edges
in a network. Edge colors indicate which types of edges are created and destroyed following each
event. (a) New infections and recoveries lead to gains and losses various edge types. (b) Two
examples of neighbor exchange events and their impacts on edge composition (below). There are
many other ways in which neighbor exchange events can impact edge composition.
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The first equation describes the decline in the number of degree one nodes that are susceptible.
If a degree one individual is susceptible, then MSI
MS
is the probability that his/her single edge is
connected to an infected node and r is the probability of transmission along that edge. Thus rMSI
MS
is the rate at which such nodes become infected.
The second equation describes the change in the fraction of edges connecting susceptible nodes
to infected nodes. This is illustrated by the gains (dark green) and losses (light green) in Figure 6.
Consider one such edge, connecting a susceptible node attached to an infected node. The first term
in the equation performs the accounting required due to transmission events. When a transmission
event occurs, turning a susceptible node to infected, we must (1) remove the single S ↔ I edge
carrying the infection (2) remove any other S ↔ I edges adjacent on the newly infected node (3)
add any S ↔ S edges adjacent on the newly infected node. The second term accounts for recovery
events, which convert edges from S ↔ I to S ↔ R. The final term corresponds to the impact
of neighbor exchanges on the fraction of S ↔ I edges. By randomly mixing the network edges,
neighbor exchanges slowly bring the fraction of S ↔ I edges to the expected fraction of such edges,
MSMI . The value MSMI corresponds to the expected number of S ↔ I edges in a network that
has the same fraction of stubs connected to susceptibles and infecteds as the original network, but
has edges re-distributed randomly between nodes.
The third equation describes the change in the fraction of edges connecting susceptible nodes
to other susceptible nodes. This is illustrated by the gains (red) and losses (orange) in Figure 6.
Consider one such edge connecting a susceptible with another a susceptible node. The first term
in the equation corresponds to loss of S ↔ S edges following an infection transmission event. The
S ↔ S edges that are turned into S ↔ I edges, added in the previous equation, must be subtracted
here. The rate of change on S ↔ S edges is doubled, since both their endpoints become infected
at the same rate. As before, the final term corresponds to the impact of neighbor exchanges on the
fraction of S ↔ S edges. Neighbor exchange acts like a spring with tension ρ slowly bringing the
fraction of S ↔ S edges to the expected value MSMS for a comparable random network.
The final equation describes the change in the fraction of stubs that are adjacent on an infected
node. This is illustrated by the gains (dark blue) and losses (light blue) in Figure 6. The first term
performs accounting due to newly created infections. When a susceptible node becomes infected
all of the edges emanating from the node add to the class of MI stubs, including the single edge
involved in the transmission. The second term in the equation governs the loss of infected stubs
through the recovery of infected nodes.
This model fares well in comparison to stochastic simulations of an analogous epidemic process
in networks, that is, it predicts an epidemic trajectory (cumulative incidence curve) that falls right
in the middle of the curves produced by stochastic simulations (see Figure 7(a)) and makes good
predictions for the final state of the epidemic (cumulative number and distribution of cases) [56, 57].
5.4 Connecting Compartmental and Network Models
The Volz-Meyers dynamic network model is not only very tractable (with just one more dynamic
variable than the standard SIR compartmental model), but also offers a mathematical and concep-
tual bridge between two disparate classes of models. That is, by changing the value of the mixing
parameter ρ, we interpolate smoothly between models without neighbor exchange (ρ = 0) and
compartmental models (ρ = ∞). In the limit of large mixing (ρ → ∞), every transmission event
from infected nodes is essentially directed at a randomly chosen node. That is, the probability
of being connected along any given edge to a susceptible, infectious, or recovered node is directly
proportional to the number of edges connected to nodes in each of these states, respectively. The
resulting model is thus a mass-action model with three dynamic variables that allows arbitrary
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heterogeneity in contact rates, as quantified by the pgf g(x). If we assume that contact rates are
homogeneous (g(x) = x), then the model exactly reduces to the standard SIR compartmental model
described earlier (see Figure 7(b)).
5.5 Advantages and Limitations of Network Models
The basic models described here make many simplifying assumptions about host population struc-
ture and epidemiological parameters. For example, the population structure is assumed to resemble
a graph with a specific degree distribution and transmission and recovery rates are assumed to be
homogeneous across both hosts and time. In the last few years, however, these models have been ex-
tended to incorporate additional complexity, including dynamic contacts, assortative connectivity,
and heterogeneity in transmission rates [45, 56, 44, 8]. While each model has its own limitations,
the framework as a whole has been shown to be versatile and is evolving to address more complex
ecological data and questions.
Since the models are simpler than the real populations they represent, modelers typically check
mathematical predictions through comparisons to actual ecological data and the results of more
complex agent-based simulations [48, 21, 9, 56]. In most cases, the analytical predictions are
consistent with the data. When significant discrepancies arise, modelers work to identify and
incorporate key dynamics missing from the model.
Although there are now many sophisticated mathematical approaches to modeling host-pathogen
dynamics, the network methods described here have several advantages. Like agent-based mod-
els and other individual-based models, they have the advantage over compartmental models of
simply and intuitively capturing heterogeneity in host contact patterns. Contact heterogeneity
profoundly influences host-pathogen dynamics both quantitatively and qualitatively and ignoring
network structure can lead to erroneous predictions [42, 56, 7]; and even small quantitative differ-
ences can be critical to effective public health and environmental management. Contact network
models have already provided important insights into disease dynamics. For example, they have
shown prior outbreaks of an immunizing disease like influenza can dramatically influence the dynam-
ics of future outbreaks, although the impact depends on the structure of the host network [21, 8].
This occurs because disease preferentially infects the most highly connected demographics. Con-
tact network models have also shed light on the heterogeneous spread of SARS [42] and the role of
hospitals in community outbreaks [41] and have been use to design effective control strategies for
respiratory diseases in health care and urban settings [48, 40] and optimal vaccination strategies for
influenza [9, 8]. Another important advantage of contact network methods is that they are math-
ematically simpler than agent-based models for capturing heterogeneous contact patterns, which
allows for rapid and accurate calculations and the derivation of analytical results.
6 Disease Control
Infectious disease models help us not only understand the dynamics of spreading pathogens but also
design effective strategies for controlling outbreaks. In this section, we describe some of the pri-
mary modes of infectious disease intervention and illustrate how mathematical and computational
methods can be used to optimize such interventions.
6.1 The fundamentals of disease control
Consider the SIR model described by Equations (7)-(9), which incorporates the natural birth and
death of individuals into the simple SIR model. To control an epidemic at any point, we would
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like to decrease dI
dt
, the number of new infected individuals created per unit time. If we are able
to make dI
dt
negative, then the number of infecteds will begin to decrease. When the number of
infecteds reaches 0, the epidemic will end.
What actions can we perform to make dI
dt
negative? Using Equation (8), we have
dI
dt
= β · S · I− γ · I− µ · I < 0.




The left hand side of Equation (14) is called the effective reproduction number, or effective R, at
the current point of the epidemic. The effective R gives us an idea of how quickly the epidemic
is currently growing. If we can get the effective R bellow one, the epidemic will begin to die.
According to Equation (14), to reduce the effective R, and thus control the epidemic, we have the
following options:
1. Reduce β, the infectivity parameter.
2. Reduce S, the fraction of susceptibles in the population.
3. Increase γ, the infectious period parameter.
4. Increase µ, the natural death rate of individuals.
Let us take each of these options in turn and give them realistic interpretations. The infectivity
parameter β can be thought of as the product of the likelihood the disease is transferred during
contact, and the likelihood that contact occurs between an infected and susceptible individual.
Thus, β can be reduced by actions like (1) quarantining infected individuals, reducing use of public
transport, closing schools, or encouraging the workforce to work from home, all of which reduce
the likelihood of contacts between infecteds and susceptibles, (2) increasing hand washing and
other hygienic precautions that potentially reduce the likelihood of transmission during contact,
and (3) rapidly treating infected individuals with antimicrobials may reduce symptoms that would
otherwise enhance transmission during contacts.
Reducing S, the number of susceptibles in the population, through vaccination is a critical and
often long-lasting disease control strategy. When susceptible individuals are effectively immunized,
they move to the resistant compartment without experiencing the disease. Some vaccines provide
immunity that lasts for decades or even a life-time, and thereby severely limit the potential for
future transmission. Equation (14), specifying the effective R, can be used to derive the fraction of
the population that must be vaccinated to prevent future growth of the epidemic. Specifically, if
the fraction of susceptibles in the population is reduced to less than γ+µ
β
, then the disease is unable
to spread. This example demonstrates how partial vaccination of a population, reducing S to a
small but non-zero value, is sufficient to protect the population as a whole. This phenomenon is
called herd immunity.
The infectious period, given that the infected person does not experience a natural death, in
the model under consideration is 1
γ
. Increasing γ, the infectious period parameter, is the same as
decreasing the infectious period. For some diseases, this can be accomplished through treatment
with antimicrobials that speed up recovery.
Finally, one can also increase the natural death rate µ. While this is not an ethical option for
human outbreaks, it is a strategy often used to control epidemics in livestock. For example, the
United Kingdom has used the culling of cows to control foot-and-mouth and mad cow disease [2, 33].
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6.2 A network modeling perspective on disease control
In the previous section we discussed strategies for bringing the reproduction number below one.
From the perspective of network models, this is equivalent to bringing the average transmissability
of a disease T below the epidemic threshold Tc. This can be achieved through interventions that
either directly reduce the infectiousness of the pathogen (i.e., lower T ), modify contact patterns
so that the pathogen cannot easily spread through the population (i.e., increase Tc), or immunize
segments of the population (i.e., increase Tc). We call these three forms of intervention transmission
reducing, contact reducing, and immunizing, respectively [48].
Transmission reducing interventions introduce physical barriers to interrupt the spread of respi-
ratory droplets or other infectious particles (e.g., face masks, hand hygiene, disinfection of animate
objects, or, in the case of sexually transmitted infections, condoms). These interventions can be
modeled by reducing the Tij , the probability of transmission from node i to node j, along the
corresponding subset of edges.
Contact reducing interventions include isolation of infected persons, quarantine of persons dur-
ing their incubation period, patient cohorting in hospitals, and closing schools or other public
spaces. They can be modeled by removing edges corresponding to contacts avoided. For example,
one can model school closures in an urban contact network by removing all edges that represent
contacts among students and staff that would occur during school.
Immunizing interventions include prophylactic treatment with antimicrobials and diverse vacci-
nation strategies including ring vaccination (targeting close contacts of current cases), vaccination
of priority groups based on risk factors such as age, health, and place of employment, and universal
vaccination. Vaccination prior to an outbreak can be modeled by removing nodes from the network
corresponding to the effectively immunized individuals.
One can manipulate contact network models to represent a variety of control measures and then
use the mathematical methods described above to predict the impact of such measures on disease
dynamics. For example, this approach has been used in collaboration with public health officials in
the US and Canada to improve public health strategies for controlling walking pneumonia [40] and
SARS [48] and for distributing limited supplies of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines [9, 8]
(see Figure 8).
6.3 Optimizing disease control policies
While predictive models of infectious disease dynamics have become quite powerful, the compu-
tational complexity of these models often impedes the systematic optimization of disease control
strategies, that is, finding the optimal demographic, spatial and temporal distribution of costly
public health resources. Thus, one typical approach within the infectious disease community has
been to evaluate a relatively small set of candidate strategies [37, 20, 9, 24], rather than consider
the full spectrum of policy options. Recently, however, researchers from diverse fields are begin-
ning to effectively couple infectious disease models with a variety of tools from operations research
including simulation optimization techniques [6]. For an extensive review of such methods, see [36].
In this section, we present one recent approach to searching large sets of infectious disease
intervention policies [17]. As we describe here, the method is parallelizable, scalable, usable in real
time, and can be adapted to work with diverse epidemic models.
Let the sequence A1, A2, . . . , AD describe a disease control strategy. Though the sequence can
be simply an arbitrary string of bits, it may be helpful to think of it as a sequence of actions taken
over a specific time period. For example, A1 describes the control action performed in the first
month, A2 describes the control action performed in the second month, and so forth.
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Suppose that we have an infectious disease simulator, sim(A1, A2, . . . , AD), that returns the
outcome of an epidemic under a specified control strategy. Since disease progression is stochastic, we
assume that sim(A1, A2, . . . , AD) is a random variable; and we can only sample from its distribution.
Further assume that the simulator always returns a real number in the interval [0, 1]. For example,
the simulator could return the fraction of the population that has not been infected by the end of
the epidemic. We can then formulate the disease control problem as follows:
max
A1,A2,...,AD
E[sim(A1, A2, . . . , AD)].
To computationally address the above optimization problem, we have designed and implemented
the Disease Control System (DiCon) [17, 25]. DiCon is a modular and extensible optimization
platform specialized to disease control with the following features:
1. Swappable, extensible optimization algorithms. DiCon includes classic algorithms like exhaus-
tive search and more recent algorithms like bandit-based search algorithms [16, 32, 38, 14].
The system also has a simple optimization algorithm interface, so that new algorithms could
be added.
2. Automatic parallelization. DiCon can both run on your laptop and on supercomputers. With
automatic job queueing and processor management, DiCon can handle multiple concurrent
optimizations with multiple processors per optimization, scaling to hundreds of processor
cores. DiCon manages all communication between processes.
3. Simple interface. DiCon has a simple interface. You specify two functions: simulate(), the
disease simulator that takes as input a sequence of control actions, and next action(), which
specifies the space of control policies.
4. Language independence. DiCon allows you to specify your simulator and space of control
policies in any programming language you choose. DiCon uses Google Protocol Buffers to
communicate with your stand-alone program. Libraries implementing Google Protocol Buffers
are available for most languages, including Python, C++, and Java.
5. Versatile job specification. DiCon allows you to run many optimizations with a single com-
mand. With a versatile specification language, one can easily try optimizations with varying
parameterizations, optimization algorithms, or control policy spaces.
6. Logging and checkpointing. DiCon has includes logging capabilities, so that you can track
optimizations during computation. DiCon also includes checkpointing, allowing you to resume
interrupted optimizations.
A preliminary version of DiCon has been used to compute release schedules for the U.S. National
Antiviral Stockpile with the purposes of delaying an influenza epidemic [17]. In that application,
the sequence of actions A1, A2, . . . , AD describes a schedule of antiviral release, with Ai describing
both the amount of antivirals to be released in the ith month and the prioritization of those
antivirals. The simulator sim(A1, A2, . . . , AD) is stochastic, combining a contact network between
cities and a compartmental model within each city. The objective of the optimization is to minimize
the number of infected individuals in the first year of the epidemic, under the constraint of using
no more antivirals than those available in the national stockpile. We used a bandit-based search
algorithm to find near-optimal distribution schedules [32, 14, 16]. Even under high levels of loss of
released antivirals, through misallocation or misuse, the optimization is able to find effective release
schedules to delay the epidemic. Some of the key results of the optimization are summarized in
Figure 9. For more details, see Dimitrov et al. [17]
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A Geometric and Exponential Random Variables
Consider the following sequence of geometric random variables. The variable X1 is the standard
geometric random variable, with success probability β and takes values in {1, 2, . . .}. The variable
X2 has success probability
β




2 , . . .}. Similarly, the variable Xk has success
probability β
k






















































So, the sequence of geometric random variables converges in distribution to an exponential random
variable with expectation 1
β
.
The idea here is that in the sequence of geometrics, we decreased the spacing between their
values and the success probability with the same scale, keeping the expected number of successes
in a unit of time the same.
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B Generation Time of an SIR Model
As a small example of the complex and model-dependent methods of parameter estimation, let us
express the generation time of the SIR model discussed in Section 2. In an SIR model, the infectious
period of an individual is an exponentially distributed random variable, with expectation 1
γ
, denoted
as Exp(γ). Consider an index case at the beginning of the epidemic, when S is approximately 1. The
infected individual produces new infected individuals with a waiting-time between new infections
that is an exponential random variable with expectation 1
β
, denoted as Exp(β). If the index case is
infected at time 0, and given that at least one new infection was created, what is the average time
of infection for the secondary cases?
Let Y ∼ Exp(γ) and Z ∼ Exp(β). The variable Y captures the infectious period of the index
case, and Z captures the waiting time between generation of consecutive secondary cases. We can
view the creation of new infected cases as a repeated “race” between Y and Z. If Z wins the race,
by being smaller than Y , then a new infected case is created and a new race is started. If Y wins
the race, then the index case recovers, the repeated races stop, and no new infected cases can be
created.
Define X1 to be the infection time of the first newly created case. Define X2 to be the difference
in the infection times between the first and second newly infected cases, so that the second newly
infected case occurs at time X1 + X2. Similarly, define X3 to be the difference in infection times
between the second and third, and so forth for Xi for i = 1 . . .. Further, let Pi be the probability













where with the innermost sum, we calculate the infection time of the jth new case; with the second
innermost sum, we calculate the average over all cases created; and finally, with the outermost sum,
we calculate the expectation over the total number of newly created cases.
To analyze Expression (15), first, recall that if Y ∼ Exp(γ) and Z ∼ Exp(β), then min(Y, Z) ∼
Exp(γ + β). Also recall that an exponential random variable has the “lack of memory” property.
In specific (Y − y | Y ≥ y) ∼ Exp(γ), for all non-negative constants y.
Now, suppose that exactly one new case is created, then the new case created at time X1 =
min(Y, Z), so X1 ∼ Exp(γ +β). If exactly two new cases are created, a new race between Y and Z
is started after time X1, because of Y ’s lack of memory property. Because of the new race, we also
have X2 = min(Y, Z), and X2 ∼ Exp(γ +β). In fact, all Xi have the same distribution, Exp(γ +β)





































We can complete our analysis of the generation time by noting that the number of new infected
individuals, which is the number of races between Y and Z in our analogy, is geometrically dis-
tributed. The variable Y has a chance of winning a given race equal to β
γ+β , which can be derived
with the appropriate integral. Whenever Y wins, the races stop, giving our geometric distribution.
Since we are given that at least one secondary case has occurred, we can use a normalized geometric

































)i(i + 1) (17)
Finally, we can use the fact that
∑∞
i=1 r
i · (i + 1) = r1−r +
r
(1−r)2
for r < 1 to simplify Expres-






The correctness of the expression can be easily verified through simulation.
This small example demonstrates the complex reasoning required for proper parameterization
of epidemic models. Simple quantities like generation time or serial number are what can be
estimated for real disease cases. To parameterize epidemic models, one must connect these real
estimates to the model parameters. This complexity combined with the importance of using the
correct parameters is perhaps one of the reasons that a large fraction of the literature on infectious
diseases is concentrated on parameter estimation.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Disease spread through a dynamic contact network. (a) We compare our mathematical
model to stochastic simulations. The mathematical predictions (circles) fall right in the center
of mass of 1000 stochastic simulations (dotted lines) of disease transmission through a dynamic
network. This assumes a Poisson network with mean degree 1.5, transmissability r = 0.2 , recovery
µ = 0.1, and mixing rate ρ = 0.25. (b) As the mixing rate increases from zero to infinity, the model
smoothly interpolates between static network models and compartmental models.
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Figure 8: Prioritizing flu vaccines under limited supplies. This study assumes that there are enough
vaccines to cover 13% of the population (as occurred during the 2004-2005 influenza vaccination
shortage) and compares the efficacies of prioritizing school children (red) versus groups at high risk
for mortality from flu (blue). We use a contact network model based on detailed sociological and
demographic information for the city of Vancouver, British Columbia; and model vaccination by
removing effectively vaccinated nodes and their edges from the network (using published estimates
for age-specific influenza vaccine efficacy). The impacts of such removals are predicted using the
bond percolation methods described above. (a) Seasonal flu model in which high risk groups include
infants and elderly. (b) Pandemic flu model (based on the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Pandemic) in
which adults have the highest mortality rates followed by infants. For a full description, see Bansal
et al. [9] The x-axes give T , the average transmissability of influenza. Estimates for for T vary across
the interval from 0.10 to 0.30 for both seasonal and pandemic flu. In both cases, prioritizing school
children is predicted to cause a greater reduction in mortality than prioritizing high-risk groups for
mildly contagious flus (low T ), while the reverse is true for more highly contagious strains (high
T ). The transition between these two outcomes occurs at a slightly higher transmissability for
pandemic flu than for seasonal flu.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Optimizing the distribution of antiviral medications from the US Strategic National Stock-
pile (SNS). (a) The network model used to stochastically simulate influenza progression throughout
the 100 most populated U.S. cities. Transmission within cities is modeled using compartmental
models and transmission among cities occurs via stochastic movement of infected travelers. The
model is parameterized with data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, and early estimates of H1N1/09 parameters [47]. Node (circle) size is proportional to
city population and edge thickness is proportional to the number of daily travelers. (b) The per-
formance of several control strategies in delaying an influenza epidemic. The x-axis gives rates
of uptake, the fraction of individuals who seek antivirals within the first 24 hours of symptoms.
On the vertical axis is the cumulative number of infected cases within the first 12 months of the
initial outbreak. The model assumes that following the distribution of antivirals to cities, they
disappear through misuse or loss, with a half life of two months. Three optimized strategies for
releasing 50M courses from the national antiviral stockpile are presented (from top to bottom):
the optimized strategy when antivirals are allowed to be released both proportional to population
size and proportional to disease prevalence, the optimized strategy when releases are exclusively
proportional to city population sizes, and the optimized strategy under an ideal situation assuming
that there is no misuse (infinite half life). In addition, several simple policies are presented ranging
from a monthly release of 1 million antiviral courses for 12 months to a single release of the entire
50M antiviral courses available in the stockpile. The results suggest that: 1) releases proportional
to prevalence are unnecessary, since the performance is the same with or without this option, 2)
careful release can overcome misuse or loss, since the best release schedules under misuse perform
as well as the idealized scenario of no misuse, and 3) the simple strategy of releasing 5M courses
monthly performs well for the H1N1/09 disease parameters. The same performance not necessarily
occur for other strains of influenza with different characteristics.
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